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The information-theoretic security promised by quantum key distribution (QKD) holds as long as the
assumptions in the theoretical model match the parameters in the physical implementation. The superlin-
ear behavior of sensitive single-photon detectors represents one such mismatch and can pave the way to
powerful attacks hindering the security of QKD systems, a prominent example being the after-gate attack.
A long-standing tenet is that trapped carriers causing delayed detection can help mitigate this attack, but
despite intensive scrutiny, it remains largely unproven. Here we approach this problem from a physical
perspective and find evidence to support a detector’s secure response. We experimentally investigate two
different carrier-trapping mechanisms causing delayed detection in fast-gated semiconductor avalanche
photodiodes, one arising from the multiplication layer and the other arising from the heterojunction inter-
face between absorption and charge layers. The release of trapped carriers increases the quantum bit error
rate measured under the after-gate attack above the typical QKD security threshold, thus favoring the
detector’s inherent security. This represents a significant step to avert quantum hacking of QKD systems.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.12.024050
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises secure
distribution of cryptographic digital keys [1], spurring sig-
nificant development of the technology. This has rapidly
matured and is now stepping out of the laboratory and into
deployment in optical fiber networks [2–8]. Contributing
to its maturity, a great deal of research has been devoted to
quantum hacking [9–13], which identifies imperfections of
QKD components from their theoretical models and evalu-
ates their implications for QKD security. Best-practice cri-
teria and countermeasures can then be developed [14–21]
to reinforce the identified weak components and reclaim
implementation security.
Because of their exposure to the quantum channel,
single-photon detectors in QKD systems have been sub-
jected to most hacking attacks in the past decade [22–24].
Weak detectors have been demonstrated to be under full
control of an eavesdropper (Eve), resulting in a collapse of
security [25]. Detector loopholes can be completely closed
by novel protocols that achieve measurement-device-
independent security [26–28]. However, these protocols
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require an intermediate relay and therefore their deploy-
ment in the network is unfavorably complex when com-
pared with that of standard point-to-point QKD links. A
solution to regain detector security is thus highly desirable
for relayless QKD links.
Single-photon detectors based on semiconductor
(In,Ga)As avalanche photodiodes (APDs) serve the major-
ity of links in existing QKD networks [2–7] because they
operate at temperatures that are easily within reach of ther-
moelectric cooling [29] or even room temperature [30].
The state-of-the-art systems can offer a key rate exceeding
10 Mb/s [31] and operate over 200 km of fiber [32].
Attacks on (In,Ga)As APDs have revealed their vulnera-
bilities, most of which have been dealt with because Eve’s
attack either changes the detector characteristics or pro-
duces a detectable fingerprint. However, as a special class
of faked state attack [9], the faint after-gate attack [33]
remains an open threat. This is because detectors under
such an attack will maintain their single-photon sensitiv-
ity and will not produce a massive photocurrent [34] as in
bright-illumination attacks.
When a photon is absorbed by an (In,Ga)As APD it gen-
erates an electron-hole pair. The hole can then become
trapped in defects or at barriers and is released with
a certain probability related to the characteristic time
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constant of the trap. As opposed to trapped carriers aris-
ing from macroscopic avalanches, whose lifetimes are on
the order of microseconds, the trapped-hole lifetime at the
material interface is of subnanosecond order. Such trap-
ping, therefore, does not have an effect in megahertz-gated
detectors [33,34]. However, under gigahertz gating, the
trapping time becomes comparable with the the detector
gating period and the release of such carriers in subsequent
gates can result in substantial numbers of delayed detec-
tion events. This could provide a means to mitigate the
faint after-gate attack. Hence, it is natural to look at fast
gigahertz-gated APDs [29] as a potential countermeasure
to this attack. So far, however, there is no study sup-
porting this conjecture. Earlier investigations were largely
concerned with megahertz-gated detectors, where the time
between gates is significantly longer than the decay time of
trapped carriers. Furthermore, the analysis of the quantum
bit error rate (QBER) previously focused solely on Eve’s
target gate [33,34], due to the contribution from delayed
detection events being negligible.
In this work, we investigate two sources of carrier trap-
ping in fast-gated (In,Ga)As APDs, one from the multipli-
cation layer and the other from the heterointerface between
the two materials, and find that both cause a non-negligible
delayed-detection probability.
This previously perceived drawback of single-photon
(In,Ga)As APDs can be used to detect an after-gate attack.
The delayed photodetection introduces an increase in the
QBER of the QKD system that unveils the attack, thus
promoting fast-gated devices as a means of mitigating this
potential vulnerability. In addition to that, we show that
the amount of induced QBER in Eve’s absence is not
excessive and still allows efficient QKD operation if the
appropriate gating frequency is chosen.
II. CARRIER TRAPPING
To give some notion of the trapping mechanism, we
provide a schematic of a typical (In,Ga)As avalanche pho-
todiode in Fig. 1(a). An incoming photon is absorbed
in the intrinsic (In,Ga)As region, where an electron-hole
pair is generated and subsequently separated by the elec-
tric field in this region. The hole needs to overcome the
potential barrier that arises from the valence-band mis-
match [35] [the shaded purple area in Fig. 1(a)] to reach
the InP multiplication region so as to have a finite prob-
ability of initiating a macroscopic avalanche that can be
electronically registered. During the generation of a macro-
scopic avalanche, some of the avalanche carriers may
become trapped and can subsequently be released at a later
time, causing a secondary avalanche, known as an “after-
pulse.” The release timescale is on the order of several
microseconds or greater [36–38].
We stress that the term “afterpulse” or “afterpulsing”
refers only to clicks that are correlated with a previous
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FIG. 1. (a) Typical band diagram of separate absorption,
charge, and multiplication structure of an (In,Ga)As/InP APD,
where Eg is the band-gap offset and EA is the effective barrier
height arising at the interface between the APD absorption and
charge regions. (b) Gating scheme. Electron-hole pairs are gen-
erated at the start of gate 1 when the laser is timed to arrival
and experience an exponential decay between the two gates. The
proportion of holes left over at gate 2 is related to the decay con-
stant, which is in turn related to the activation energy given by
the barrier height, EA.
detection event. The notion of “delayed detection,” on
the other hand, is more general and it encompasses after-
pulsing. It refers to all detection events originating from
trapped carriers, even those that did not give rise to a
detected avalanche in a previous gate.
The ability of the hole to overcome the valence-band
discontinuity, which is a potential barrier, directly affects
device characteristics such as detection efficiency and tim-
ing response [39]. However, it is reasonable to conclude
that the hole trap time is significantly shorter than 1 ns
because subnanosecond gated APDs still show detection
efficiencies as high as 55% [29]. If the decay time were
longer than 1 ns, then fewer than half of the generated
carriers would overcome the barrier and the detection effi-
ciency would not be able to exceed 50%. We can infer from
this analysis that the hole-trap lifetime is at least 3 orders
of magnitude shorter than that of deep traps causing after-
pulses and we specially devised an experiment to study it,
which is schematically illustrated in Fig. 1(b). We optically
excite an APD at the start of a gate. When a hole fails to
overcome the potential barrier within gate 1, it will have
a finite probability to overcome the barrier and initiate a
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macroscopic avalanche in subsequent gates within several
nanoseconds.
III. TRAPPING AT THE MATERIAL INTERFACE
For this study we operate the (In,Ga)As APDs in gated
Geiger mode at a clock frequency of 1 GHz. The avalanche
signals are discriminated with the help of self-differencing
circuits that remove the capacitive response to the applied
gate [40]. A telecom-C-band passively-mode-locked laser
synchronized to the APD gating frequency and with a rep-
etition frequency of 20 MHz and a pulse width of 3 ps is
used to illuminate the APD via its single-mode-fiber pig-
tail. We follow the best-practice criteria [20] to set the
discrimination level of the self-differencing APD. Time-
tagging electronics with a dead time of 50 ns are used to
record the photon-detection histogram [29]. We measure
several (In,Ga)As APDs with different active diameters:
50 and 16 µm. In this paper we present results from two
16-µm devices: namely, APD 1 and APD 2. The 50-µm
devices show similar behavior. Unless otherwise stated,
the data presented are from APD 1.
We first examine the effect of the interface on the
APD. The APD is characterized as having a single-photon-
detection efficiency of 28% and an afterpulsing probability
of 4% at room temperature. Here the optical flux µ is
maintained at 0.1 photons per pulse and the laser delay
is set to enable the photon arrival at the beginning of
the illuminated gate [schematically shown in Fig. 1(b)],
thus allowing an avalanche to have sufficient time to grow
above the discrimination level and hence have a max-
imum detection efficiency. Figure 2(a) shows a typical
photon-detection histogram under such illumination con-
ditions. The illuminated gate gives a pronounced peak
arising from single-photon detection events. Immediately
after this peak, the count rate experiences a fast decay
before reaching an approximately flat background at the
fifth gate. The flat background is attributed to detector dark
and afterpulsing counts. The elevated count rates between
2 and 4 ns (gates 2–4) cannot be attributed to detector
afterpulsing because the time tagger has a dead time of
50 ns. Moreover, the subnanosecond decay time is orders
of magnitude faster than typical lifetimes of deep traps
that are responsible for afterpulsing. We attribute the ele-
vated count rates at these gates to delayed photon detection
caused by hole trapping at the absorption-charge interface.
The above conclusion is supported by temperature-
dependent measurements. It is possible to extract the inter-
face trapping lifetime by comparing counts in gates 1 and
3 in the histogram data (gate 2 is ignored due to the pos-
sibility of cancellation from the self-differencer). Plotting
these lifetimes at different temperatures in an Arrhenius
configuration, where the excess bias as a proportion of the
breakdown voltage is kept constant for each temperature,
allows us to extract the effective barrier height, EA, at the
(a)
(b)
FIG. 2. (a) Time-resolved histogram of detected counts of the
APD under illumination by a pulsed laser with flux µ = 0.1,
clearly demonstrating an exponential decay in counts after the
initial illuminated gate. (b) Arrhenius plot showing the single-
photon detection efficiency as a function of the inverse of the
temperature, where the respective gradients allow the extraction
of the hole activation energy.
material interface [35], shown in Fig. 2(b), where the gra-
dient is equal to EA/kBT. The activation energies (tens
of millielectronvolts, corresponding to lifetimes of several
hundreds of picoseconds) and the trend of higher excess
biases resulting in overall shorter lifetimes, and conse-
quently lower activation energies, are consistent with the
literature [35,41]. This implies that carriers with decays
of several hundred picoseconds are dominated by trapping
at the heterointerface when the APD is illuminated with
fluxes on the order of single photons.
IV. MITIGATING THE FAINT AFTER-GATE
ATTACK
Carriers with decays of several hundred picoseconds
could be used to mitigate the faint after-gate attack. This
is because Eve’s attempt to mount such an attack using
moderately high fluxes would result in delayed detection
024050-3
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events that would alert the users to her presence. The sub-
nanosecond separation between gates in gigahertz-clocked
APDs is sufficiently narrow to allow delayed detection
as a result of carriers with a decay on the order of sev-
eral hundred picoseconds to be observed, where they
would be missed in slower, megahertz-clocked systems
[33,34]. However, we find that in this regime, traps in the
multiplication region become the dominant contribution to
delayed detection events, which we now examine.
In more detail, the after-gate attack is a class of faked
state attack, which itself is a type of intercept-and-resend
attack [9]. Eve measures the photons sent by the trans-
mitter, Alice, with a copy of Bob’s apparatus. She then
sends her own pulses to Bob, which are detected only if
he chooses the same measurement basis as Eve, otherwise
he registers nothing. In this way, after Alice and Bob have
exchanged basis information, Eve has a string that is per-
fectly correlated with that held by Alice and Bob. The aim
for Eve is thus to send a pulse that at full power registers
a click with a detection probability of 1 and at half power
(corresponding to incompatible bases) registers with prob-
ability 0. More generally, when the probability at full
power exceeds twice that at half power in this manner, the
detector behavior is said to be “superlinear.” If Eve sends
attack pulses toward the end of Bob’s APD gate, she can
maximize the ratio of detection probabilities of full-power
and half-power pulses such that she learns most of the key
and also generates a sufficiently low QBER to go unde-
tected. The original demonstration [33] involved sending
pulses of moderately high photon flux (approximately 40
photons per pulse) at the end of the APD gate.
By obtaining the detection probability at full power and
half power, one can derive the resultant QBER using the
following equation from Ref. [33]:
Q =
2ph − p
2
h
2pf + 2(2ph − p
2
h )
, (1)
where pf is the detection probability at full power and ph
is the detection probability at half power. This equation
ignores any errors arising from dark counts or afterpulsing
and thus focuses only on the detection probability at the
target gate. If the QBER drops below approximately 21%,
this indicates superlinearity as pf > 2ph.
We demonstrate here that gigahertz-gated APDs could
also show superlinear behavior when the delayed photon-
detection events are not considered (i.e., the situation when
only the target gate is considered). Here we measure the
detection probability at full power (80 photons per pulse)
and half power(40 photons per pulse) of an optical trigger
pulse as a function of the arrival time of the laser pulse
on the APD (these values are chosen due to their use in
the original demonstration in Ref. [33], but other optical
powers are also investigated, the results of which are given
in the Appendix). We do this by varying the delay on the
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
N
o
rm
a
liz
e
d
 c
o
u
n
ts
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
N
o
rm
a
liz
e
d
 c
o
u
n
ts
Time (ns)
mu = 40
mu = 80μf
μh
20 oC
–30 oC
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
130 140 150 160 170 180
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Q
B
E
R
 (
%
)
Eq. (1)
Eq. (3)
Q
B
E
R
 (
%
)
20 oC
–30 oC
(a)
(c)
(b)
(d)
190
Separation from maximum single-
photon detection efficiency (ps)
FIG. 3. (a) QBER as a function of temporal separation from
the maximum single-photon detection efficiency. The black line
indicates the case where delayed detection is ignored and the
QBER is calculated with Eq. (1) and Eve appears not to intro-
duce a QBER greater than 11% and thereby remains undetected.
When delayed detection is taken into account, as shown by the
blue line calculated with Eq. (2), the QBER rises above 11% and
she can be detected. (b) Histograms taken at minimum QBERs
showing the detection probabilities in each gate at 20 ◦C. Under
half-power illumination of µ = 40 (in orange), gate 2 is always
larger than gate 1, which would result in a QBER of 50% in that
gate. (c) As (a) but measured with the APD at −30 ◦C. (d) As (b)
but measured with the APD at −30 ◦C.
pulse generator providing the ac signal to the APD. The
result is given for two APD temperatures (20 and −30 ◦C)
as the black lines in Figs. 3(a) and 3(c). At a certain tempo-
ral separation from maximum detection, the QBER drops
below 11% (illustrated as the dotted red line), reaching a
minimum of approximately 7% at around 153 ps at room
temperature, suggesting Eve could mount such an attack
at this delay and remain undetected. Either side of this
trough, the QBER is 25% since either pf = ph = 1 around
the center of the gate or pf = ph ≈ 0 outside the gate.
To probe the effect of delayed detection, we examine the
histograms in the vicinity of the superlinear regime (i.e.,
corresponding to the conditions of an after-gate attack),
as shown in Figs. 3(b) and 3(d). For the cases where
Eve is using the after-gate attack, a higher proportion of
clicks occur in the gate adjacent to the target gate (gate
2 as opposed to gate 1) when she chooses an incom-
patible basis to Bob, shown as the salmon-colored bars.
Delayed detection events would have a 50% QBER as
they are uncorrelated with Alice’s qubit preparation. Since
a higher proportion of clicks occur in the adjacent gate
for incompatible bases, this corresponds to an afterpuls-
ing probability of more than 100%, which is significantly
greater than the 4% afterpulse probability measured for
the single-photon case. For compatible bases, the detec-
tion probability in gate 2 is approximately 15% of that in
024050-4
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gate 1, which is in stark contrast to the single-photon case
shown in Fig. 2(a), where gate 2 is approximately 1% of
the size of gate 1.
The degree of trapping is greater in the multiphoton
case than in the single-photon case for two reasons. First,
more carriers are generated in the absorption region for
the multiphoton case; therefore, the probability of a car-
rier becoming “trapped” at the material interface is greater.
Second, as pulses are sent at the end of the gate, the elec-
tric field in the device is lower; therefore, carriers that are
generated and subsequently trapped in the multiplication
region have a smaller probability of escaping the traps
within the initial gating period and are consequently more
likely to be released in the following gating period when
the electric field is raised again.
This underlines the importance of incorporating delayed
detection events into the calculation of the QBER. To this
end, we estimate the delayed-detection probabilities under
full-power and half-power pulses and add them to the
detection probability without delayed detection. This leads
us to the following expression for the QBER:
Q′ =
2p ′h − (p
′
h)
2
2p ′f + 2[2p
′
h − (p
′
h)
2]
, (2)
p ′f (h) = pf (h) + pDD, (3)
pDD =
1
4
pDD|f +
1
2
pDD|h. (4)
Q′ in Eq. (2) represents the QBER measured in the pres-
ence of the after-gate attack when delayed detection is
taken into account. This is accounted for with the term
pDD, which represents the average probability per gate of
a one-gate-delayed detection. The factor 1/4 (1/2) in the
expression is due to their being a click in Bob’s detectors
when his basis matches (does not match) Eve’s basis in
the previous gate. In Eq. (4), pDD|f (pDD|h) is the proba-
bility of a delayed detection in gate n when a full-power
(half-power) pulse impinges on the detector at gate n − 1,
represented as a violet-colored (salmon-colored) bar in
Fig. 3(b) [Fig. 3(d)].
Using this result, we plot the resulting QBER from
Eq. (2) with blue lines in Figs. 3(a) and 3(c). As is appar-
ent from the figures, the 11% security threshold, typical of
the BB84 protocol, is now overcome. This result highlights
the effectiveness of the delayed detection at mitigating the
faint after-gate attack.
By including contributions from delayed detection in
Eq. (2), we assume Eve mounts her attack all of the time.
We therefore address the case where Eve attacks only a
fraction of the gates. In this case, the overall QBER will
be smaller than the 11% tolerance, and thus Alice and
Bob will not abort their key exchange. However, Eve’s
information will also be smaller. In a worst-case scenario,
we can reason as follows [17]. We assume for simplicity
that Eve attacks “every other gate,” so she introduces
errors in the odd gates and no errors in the even gates.
Therefore, the users can notice an odd-even pattern in the
measured QBER and could draw two different key rates,
one extracted from odd gates and one extracted from even
gates. The resulting key rate will be given by the sum of the
two partial key rates. Because of the convexity dependence
of the key rate on the QBER [42,43], the resulting key rate
when Eve attacks every other gate will always be greater
than the key rate when she attacks every gate, thus con-
firming that it would be best for Eve to attack every gate.
This conclusion can be generalized to different attacking
patterns and holds under the assumption that the users can
recognize such patterns from a detailed analysis of their
QBER. However, we also notice that the above rationale
overestimates Eve’s chances to gain information because
it assumes that the QBER is zero for the cases where Eve
does not attack, whereas in the real case it is clearly larger
than zero due to the delayed-detection effect.
We also consider the case where Eve attempts to con-
duct a hybrid attack, where she attempts to blind counts in
gate 2 and thus suppress any erroneous counts as a result
of her after-gate attack on gate 1. While it has been shown
that blinding attacks are ineffective against appropriately
operated self-differencing APDs [20], this places the onus
on the user, and such devices are often improperly used.
However, for Eve to blind gate 2, because of the cancella-
tion nature of the self-differencing circuit, she would also
have to shine strong light on gate 1, thereby negating her
original attack.
V. TRAPPING IN THE MULTIPLICATION
REGION
Differently from the interface trapping effect, the origin
of the delayed detection is predominately due to carrier
trapping in the multiplication region. Consequently these
delayed detection events feature longer lifetimes com-
pared with that of interface trapping events. At 20 ◦C, the
lifetimes extracted from Fig. 3(b) are comparable to the
those in the case shown in Fig. 2(b). However, at −30 ◦C,
the lifetimes become much longer than those shown in
Fig. 2(b) for the same temperature, by approximately 2–3
times. This suggests the existence of deeper traps and that
these traps, rather than the material interface, are respon-
sible for the delayed detection in the after-gate attack. We
believe these deeper traps are located in the multiplication
region.
This is supported by our measuring the detection proba-
bility in the adjacent gate [gate 2 in Fig. 1(b)] as a function
of separation from the maximum detection for APD 2,
as shown in Fig. 4. From left to right, the optical pho-
ton pulse is moving away from the end of gate 1 and
approaching the start of gate 2. The detection probabil-
ity initially decreases as the laser approaches gate 2. Here
024050-5
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-
FIG. 4. Detection probability in gate 2 as a function of temporal
separation from the maximum single-photon detection efficiency
for APD 2. The increased detection probability on the left-
hand side can be explained by the dominance of trapping in the
multiplication region.
impact ionization is occurring and therefore carriers are
multiplied and a portion of these multiplied carriers are
trapped in the multiplication region, shown in purple. The
high detection probability on the left-hand side roughly
coincides with the QBER dip, underlining that delayed
detection largely arises from trapping in the multiplica-
tion layer. If the interface were the major contributor, the
detection would continue to increase the closer to gate 2
the optical pulse is as the carriers have a progressively
shorter time to decay before gate 2 is activated. However,
at a certain point the probability flattens and then begins
to increase, an observation which is consistent with inter-
face trapping, suggesting it starts to take over once carriers
cease to become trapped in deep levels at the multiplication
region.
Using the discovery of delayed detection allows us to
define the best practice for choosing a suitable gating
frequency for QKD. For this analysis at two different tem-
peratures, 20 and −50 ◦C, we consider trapping only at the
material interface. This is the more-conservative definition
from a security point of view, as it requires higher gat-
ing frequencies to maintain the delayed detection required
to preserve the protection against the after-gate attack.
This range of gating frequencies fulfills two criteria: (i)
the gating frequency is low enough to separate adjacent
gates temporally such that a click in the first gate has a
small enough probability to have a delayed detection in
the second gate without raising the QBER above the tol-
erance threshold of 11% under operation in the absence
of Eve; (ii) equally, the gating frequency is high enough
such that Eve would cause clicks in the gate adjacent to
her target gate with a large enough probability to raise
the QBER above the aforementioned threshold, which we
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FIG. 5. QBER as a function of gating frequency at 20 and
−50 ◦C. The central white region indicates suitable operation,
where the APD is both safe from the after-gate attack and has
sufficiently low noise to make QKD possible.
examine for a conservative attacking flux of µ = 20 pho-
tons per pulse that is favorable for hiding Eve’s presence
(see the Appendix). Our simulation result is shown in
Fig. 5, with the narrow white band indicating a regime
where the APD is neither too “noisy” nor “vulnerable.”
Because of the longer carrier decays at lower tempera-
tures, lower temperatures are more favorable for slower
gating, whereas higher temperatures are more suited to
faster gating. Most significantly, gating frequencies of
around 1 GHz, which are commonly used for QKD exper-
iments (e.g., Refs. [5,31,44]) as well as in this study, fall
in the white region, suggesting these are optimal values
for QKD.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we investigate two sources of trapping
of carriers in (In,Ga)As APDs: at the valence-band mis-
match arising at the interface between the APD absorption
and charge regions, and at deep traps in the multipli-
cation region. In characterizing the carrier lifetime at
the heterojunction, we provide an explanation for short
decays observed in fast-gated APDs. We determine that
in the after-gate regime, however, the major contribution
to delayed detection events that can provide enhanced
security arises from traps in the multiplication region. We
provide evidence that fast-gated APDs can be used to miti-
gate the after-gate attack due to the additional contribution
to the QBER that arises from delayed detection events. By
exploiting the intrinsic imperfection of the material inter-
face, we are able to bound the appropriate APD gating
frequency suitable for use in QKD.
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APPENDIX
For the demonstration of the attack presented in this
paper, we chose µf = 80 and µh = 40 as the full-power
and half-power fluxes, respectively, as these were values
used in the original proposal in Ref. [33]. By expanding
our measurement to examine a range of fluxes at room
temperature, we are able to obtain a more-general pic-
ture of the parameters that Eve could use, as shown in the
measurement performed with a fast oscilloscope in Fig. 6.
The dark-purple regions within the dotted line indicate
a flux and delay combination that produces a QBER that
is lower than 11% when calculated with Eq. (1), within
which Eve will choose to operate. The pale-yellow parts in
the top left of Fig. 6 indicate a QBER of 25%, which occurs
when pf = ph = 1. This overall trend in Fig. 6 implies that
the closer to the center of the gate Eve moves, the smaller
the flux she should use to mount her attack. This suggests
that this is an extension of the original proposed after-gate
attack [45], where the APD is operating in linear mode
and strong pulses of power Pth overcome the discrimina-
tion level and cause the detector to click, whereas pulses
of power Pth/2 often do not overcome the discrimination
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FIG. 6. Contour plot of the QBER calculated with Eq. (1) as a
function of the flux of the trigger pulse and APD gate delay with
respect to the laser. The region inside the dotted line indicates
where the QBER is lower than 11% and thus Eve can mount
a successful attack in this parameter space if delayed detection
events are ignored.
level and therefore rarely cause a click. By our focusing on
the edge of the gate, a smaller flux is required to generate
the same effect, which is the most-favorable case for Eve.
The smallest attacking flux of µ = 20 is therefore used in
determining the appropriate gating frequencies in Fig. 5.
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